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A SKETCH OF THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF
ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AS'DISPLAYED
IN ANGLO-SAXON LAW.'
HAMPTON L.

CARSON.
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We have been so long accustomed in the administration of criminal justice to the essential features of a prosecution instituted and
conducted by a public officer in behalf of the public peace and safety
and a defence by counsel upon all matters of fact as well as of law,
under the control of a judge substantially indifferent to everything
except to the voice of legal justice, that we are apt to overlook the
slow and painful steps by which this happy consummation of procedure was reached.
The origin of the doctrine of a King's peace, with a right on the
part of the sovereign to control the prosecution in the place of a reyengeful private prosecutor taking the matter of punishment into his
own hands, is far distant from our own day. Criminal justice, as
now known, has been slowly evolved from various substitutes for
private war.' Among all the northern tribes the gratification of private revenge was one of the strongest passions. Families and clans
were bound by particular laws of honor to resent affronts or injuries
offered to any of their members. Retaliation naturally led to bloody
feuds, and although the dread of private vengeance acted at times as
a partial restraint upon crimes of violence, yet the general condition
was one of social anarchy. The efforts to remedy this were crude
and halting, and more than twelve hundred years elapsed before England rid herself of scenes of terror and blood in the enforcement of
the criminal law.
A German scholar, whose name is not given, but whose remark
is substantially stated by Mr. Laughlin in an essay upon The AngloSaxon Legal Procedure, has aptly illustrated the distinction between
a modern suit, whether civil or criminal, and a proceeding, if such it
could be called, of the primitive German period, by comparing the
former to a syllogism, in which the body of judicial rules is the
'A paper read at the Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Institute
of Criminal Law and Criminology, held at Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 16th,
1915,2 in joint session with the American Bar Association.
0f the Philadelphia Bar.
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major, and the declaration of facts the minor premise, while the latter, lacking all the structural exactness of a syllogism, consisted simply of a stern demand by the injured party upon the defendant for
compensation or for blood. Following out this idea, by pushing our
analysis so far as is practicable in the light of all that has been done
within the last seventy years by the great German, Russian, English, French and American students of the Teutonic origin of Continental and English institutions, we find that under the most archaic
German procedure the underlying principle was one of self-help, or,
to put it concisely, of self-redress. The injured party took the law
into his own hands. He was his own judge and his own avenger.
He seized upon the body or the goods of the offender without the
intervention of a court. In helping himself to his own share of justice, his sole conception of the wrong done was that it involved himself alone, and hence in dealing with it he assumed and exercised
judicial powers in his own case, and was his own executioner. In
what we would call the punishment of a crime, or a resort to the
civil procedure of distress, he acted without restraint. He was both
judge and warrior; for in doing that which we moderns would call
levying execution, he exacted blood for blood by virtue of the inherently sovereign power vested in himself as an individual. Siegel has
said that the archaic German procedure was essentially and radically
characterized by the absolute independence by which the individual
enforced his right. Each individual was the protector of his own
rights by whatever power he possessed, and was in the same manner
the avenger of his own wrongs. Both in civil distress and vengeance
for injuries, this was a period of summary action by the individual.
Vengeance, arising from the doctrine of self-help, as Schmid has
pointed out, was the manifestation of this summary execution in the
sphere of criminal law, and could be defined as killing, or an assault
with arms resulting in death or wounds, and presupposing a wrong
for which retaliation was made. This was the first stage.
It is very apparent how much this is to be distinguished from
the criminal law of today. Individual right and power have now
given way to judicial jurisdiction. Today every breach of the peace
is a transgression against the sovereign, whether king, emperor or
people. The sovereign power alone can prosecute criminals. The individual or civil side is left to the law of torts. The criminal side
is in the interest of the public. No one can presume of his own authority to exact vengeance from those who have wronged him. The
sovereign of today-whatever be the form of government-stands in
bold contrast to the individual among the ancient Teutons; and the
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prosecution instituted today at the instance of the king is strongly
contrasted to the "prosecution by appeal" at the instance of a private
party, which long existed in English law--a remnant of the earliest
polity of the Anglo-Saxons acting on the customs of their Teutonic
ancestry.
In tracing the growth of the power of government over the individual; the establishment of Courts of Justice; the gradual suppression of private warfare; the substitution of permanent kings for temporary rulers; and, in the course of time, the assumption by the king
of what Mr. Allen, in his Inquiry into the Rise and Growth of the
Royal Prerogative, calls the "ideal attributes of absolute perfection,
absolute immortality and legal ubiquity," we reach a second stage,
which I may state as follows:
In the gradual development and organization of the state, vengeance while still abroad as a crude method of executing law, was
not allowed unless clearly used by the individual as an instrument of
law. Wilda has shown, in discussing the sources of northern law as
contrasted to those -of Rome, that vengeance in time was used in the
sense of an enmity which caused the injured party to seize, bind and
bring his foe before a. court; or to pursue his suit unrelentingly until
outlawry was imposed. Folk-courts were established, and it became a rule, at, first more honored in the breach than in the observance, that vengeance must b&,authorized by previous permission
of the court; or, if it preceded the judgment, it must be justified
afterwards before the same tribunal; vengeance, therefore, could not
legally be an act of pure free will, since the avenger could be brought
to answer for his deed, and show reason why he -slew his foe. Sir
Henry Maine, in his -Early History of Institutions, declares that
"there is much reason, ihi fact, for thinking that, in the earliest times
and before the full tevelopmenf of that kingly authority which has
lent so much vigor to the arm of the law in most Aryan cornmurities
* *
* courts of justice existe-dless for the purpose of doing right.
universally than for the purpose of, supplying an alternative to the
.
violent redress of wrong."
Then came a third stage; the establishmen, of a relationship -between the fact of accusation and the forn. of :procedure. It became
a regular characteristic of Teutonic law to insist;-igorously -upon the
strict observance of forms and a minute attention to external observances. In. this we may discerf 'the germs of" the comparatively
modern doctrines as to what present day critics denounce as 'the technicalities of indictments. The free judgment of the court was limited within such narrow bounds as were set by the forms and maxims

DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW

651

of the old procedure. Thus the original independence of the individual in the sphere of self-help became gradually controlled by the
severe constraint of procedural forms. It was in no modern sense a
trial. It did not involve a judgment based either on opinion or even
conscience. It aimed at no analysis of law. It was simply a preliminary to the further prosecution of the case. The introduction of
the matter lay in the hands of the injured party, and he wa required
to summon his opponent with prescribed formalities. He declared
the subject-matter of his complaint in solemn words directed not to
the court, but to the defendant; and on the defendant's answer depended the further procedure. The burden of proof, as we would
call it, was put either upon the plaintiff or the defendant according to
the method of statement; most frequently upon the defendant. There
was no presumption of innocence in his behalf, such as was known
in later days. A thief, an adulterer or a murderer caught in the act
was exposed to vengeance. Side by side with the effort to control
private vengeance stood the fact of feud; or rather a condition of
feud as an existing fact. I put it this way, because there was no
right of feud. Feud was outside of the law and in opposition to it,
springing inevitably out of passions common to untamed human nature. A wrong done to a man was a wrong done to his kinsmen,
which his kinsmen were prompt to resent. If A killed B, B's kinsmen sought to avenge his death. The kinsmen of A rallied to his
support and a private war arose which could be strictly called
feud, a condition of warfare perilous to the state and destructive to
life and peace, but nevertheless in consonance to the wild spirit of
freedom. So strongly was this spirit supported by family pride, that
when an accuser brought an offender to court, each brought with
him such numbers as to ensure a bloody conflict in the effort to enforce or to resist a judgment of outlawry. The feud, as chronicled
by Tacitus, held its position even in- England long after the Norman
Conquest.
A fourth stage was reached in the effort to limit vengeance and
its consequent feuds by the creation of a system of compositions for
injuries by pecuniary compensation, and its extension over cases of
killing.. In support of this it was provided that not until compensation had been withheld could vengeance be taken. Full opportunity
was to be given to the wrongdoer to make compensation before he
could be handed over to outlawry. Thus, two opposing currents met
before commingling; the one, vengeance and feud out of harmony,
with the peace of the state, yet allowed to exist sub-modo; the other,
an effort to legalize an act of private vengeance by turning the wild-
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est of passions to the support of law. This was done by extending
the support of the court to the act of the accuser in bringing his accusation to a judicial hearing before attempting private vengeance.
If the accused, as was frequently the case, could not discharge or release himself he was pronounced an outlaw. He was a peace-breaker,
who was an enemy of the king and all of the king's friends, inimicus
regis et omnium amicorum ejus. He was put out of the pale of the
king's peace and of the folk-peace. No one could harbor or support him. This, if done, was in itself a crime. He was to be hunted
down and slain like a wolf. In all of this we have none of the elements of a conception of punishment as such. It was simply the
pursuit of an ex parte proceeding based on a breach of the peace to
the bitter end of outlawry in an effort to maintain the peace. It substituted the state for the kinsmen of the accuser in the pursuit of
vengeance. It put the state, as Maurer says, in an attitude of war in
regard to the offender, as it would have done against a foreign
enemy.
Then came a fifth stage, which was a notable advance: the classification of offenses deserving of outlawry, and those which did not
call for such severity, and we at once perceive the germ of the much
later distinction between felonies and misdemeanors.
Wilda calls
the graver crimes, such as killing, arson, house-breaking and theft of
cattle, involving decided breaches of the peace, causae majores, and
those which were accidental, or free from premeditation or wilfulness, causae minores. The number of offenses falling within each
category would vary from time to time, but the principle was there.
The slighter crimes could always be compounded for money; some of
the graver ones also, not excluding killing, except where especially
aggravated. And thus arose generally the distinction between offenses which were expiable or emendable, and those which were inexpiable, unpurchasable or unemendable. And here we perceive the
germ of the rule that a felony could not be compounded.
Then came a sixth stage. Particularly disgraceful or heinous
crimes, such as treason to a king or to a lord, desertion from service, secret murder, followed by flight or the hiding of the body;
adultery, where the offender was caught in flagrante delicto, and
wholesale stealing and driving off of cattle, cilled for treatment to
which neither outlawry nor compositions applied. This led to the
true idea of punishments. The state appeared not as a belligerent
against a member of society, but as a castigator, and the unlimited
right of the community to' hunt down and slay the offender was converted into the duty to catch and deliver the offender to the state for
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pu'nishment by the state. Not unless he resisted capture or escaped
from custody could he be slain with impunity.
Bearing in mind the features of these successive stages, and observing particularly that the earliest positive knowledge extant in regard to Anglo-Saxon law dates from about 600 A. D.*, when the
dooms of .Ethelbert of Kent were written, we can fix the date of
the Anglo-Saxon criminal law, so far as we know it and can trace it,
as occurring during the period of transition between the third and

the fourth stages just described, a period marked on the Continent
by the codes of the Ripuarian Franks, the Burgundians, the Visigoths
and the Lombards.'
3From the foregoing review of the results of the labors of the profound
modern students of our institutions, which were quite unknown to the learning
of Coke, Hale, Blackstone, Reeves and Crabb, we are entirely prepared to
agree with the remark of Mr. Laughlin that "to justly estimate the AngloSaxon law, appeal must be made to the German law of the Continent and to
other German codes; and the primitive German procedure must be kept clearly
in view." We are also prepared to agree with him in the further remark that
"Thorpe is, of course, in error when he says that the original institutes of the
English wfere 'little beyond that portion of-the laws of Ethelbert which contains the penalties for wounds and other bodily injuries.'" In fact, I find, on
reading Mr. Thorpe's introduction to his edition of "Ancient Laws and Institutes of England," published by the Record Commissioners in 1840, that his
statement is not to be taken too strictly, for what he said as just quoted was
by way of an argumentative disposal of the question as he put it: "When
did the earlier of these institutes originate? for if brought by our forefathers
from their German home we ought apparently give to them credit for a degree
of civilization beyond that usually ascribed to them." It is quite clear, I think,
that the crddlt can be safely extended without detracting from the value belonging to the conclusion by Thorpe that "what we now possess of AngloSaxon law is but a portion of what once existed, and, therefore, without claim
to the title The Anglo-Saxon Laws, which has usually been bestowed on it.
Of the laws and kindred documents no longer extant, the names of some,
together with fragments worked into other codes, have been transmitted to us,
such as the Mercian Laws of Offa, from which Alfred, in framing his body
of laws, selected such portions as were suitable to his purpose; the South
Anglian Laws, the Fridgewritu," etc. Upon this he shrewdly and significantly
remarks: "We ought not, perhaps, to suppose that among our Saxon forefathers, any more than among ourselves, there ever existed a complete Corpus
Juris Anglici, but that theirs was also a Customary or Common Law; and that
what we still possess, and also the portion that has perished, were either the
records of decisions to serve as precedents for the future, or enactments passed
in the Witena-gemots for the repeal, confirmation, amendment or completion of
the law as it then stood." Mr. Allen, who was one of the Commissioners of
the Public Records of the Kingdom to assist Mr. Thorpe, and who had the
assistance of the distinguished constitutional historian, Mr. Hallam, and the
profoundly learned lawyer, Mr. Baron Parke, suggested in an independent work
the division of Anglo-Saxon laws into customary or common law; statutes;
and domar or adjudged cases or precedents. This is applying the classifications
of the old Common Law writers, such as Coke, Hale and Blackstone, to the
rude materials of the Anglo-Saxon age, but yet it seems to be justified, for a
glance at the laws themselves, particularly those of the Kentish Kings, discloses support to the classification in the preambles to many of the Statutes,
and in numerous cases, the occurrence of which no human foresight could ever
have contemplated, while the entire absence of definitions of crimes, but the
free use of terms as if clearly and commonly understood, argues -the preexistence of a customary law. All reasonable doubt, however, will be dissipated
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We now proceed to consider the substantive Anglo-Saxon Criminal Law.
A comparison of the Laws or Dooms of the twelve kings from
2F-thelbert to Edward the Confessor, adopted by the monarchs with
the aid of bishops and other wise men, reveals a close resemblance,
many being in large part re-enactments, with occasional additions or
variations, mixed with moral precepts, the Ten Commandments, extracts from Exodus and the Acts of the Apostles. This was the
manner, especially, in which Alfred the Great improved upon the
work of his predecessors. Taken as a body, the dooms covered a
period of nearly five hundred years, and present a strange medley of
acts and scenes without order or arrangement. Slayings, stealings,
house-breakings, drinkings, bone-bitings, nose-piercings, shoulderlamings, toe-cuttings, eye-punchings, abduction of maidens, selling of
daughters to servitude, buying new wives in place of faithless ones
at the expense of the paramours as a compensation to outraged husbands, oppression of strangers, neglect of baptisms and offerings to
devils, whether occurring in churches, dwelling-houses, markets, alehouses, or at open graves, are so mixed in the texts with fines, botes
to the injured party, wites to the king, or sometimes both, atonements
and admonitions as to make analysis difficult. By careful attention,
how6ver, to the section headings of the Record Commissioners and
their very learned notes, by turning to the chapter headings of Sir
Matthew Hale's analytical History of the Pleas of the Crown, and by
in the mind of anyone who will read understandingly and wittingly the Introduction to Pollock and Maitland's History of English Law, where, after stating
that they ought to say that in their opinion the law which prevailed in England
before the coming of the Normans was in the main pure Germanic law, they
come to the solid ground of known history, and find that English laws have
been formed in the main from a source of Teutonic customs, with some additions of matter, and considerable additions or modifications of form received
directly or indirectly from the Roman system. This they think, however, was
at a much later date; hence they take, first, the Germanic material of English
laws, and begin with the ctistoms and institutions brought in by the English
Conquest of Britain, or rather by the series of conquests which led to the
foundation of the English Kingdom. This they call "the prime stock," but they
assert that it by no means accounts for the whole of the Germanic elements.
A distinct Scandinavian strain came -in with the Danish invasions and was
secured by the short period of Danish sovereignty. To some extent, but probably to no great extent, the Norman law and practice of William the Conqueror
may have included similar matter.
In a most interesting work, written from a totally different point of view,
but based upon a minute examination of the ancient records, Mr. Pike, in his
History of Crime in England, declares: "there is' no doubt that the settlers
who crossed the German Ocean, and gave the name of England to Southern
Britain, brought with them iertain customs which, with little modification, c6instituted for many centuries the criminal law of the country. * * * It seems
impossible that the rules for detecting and punishing crime which the Normans
found in England, and from xWhich a portion of our modern law has painfully
emerged, canif have. come to us from any but a Teutofiic source."
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confining one's attention to the portions of the text which relate to
Anglo-Saxon times, Coke's Third Institute by comparison being
quite disorderly, by picking one's way through Reeves and Crabb in
their histories, and, lastly, by reading and re-reading the refreshing
chapters of Stephen, Pollock and Maitland, and Holdsworth, it is
possible to segregate the Saxon matter from the Norman, although
it is impossible in dealing with so dark and distant an age to be exact
in chronology. Then, too, we must constantly bear in mind the
warning of both Maitland and of Holdsworth that we must rid ourselves of modern notions as to the meaning of words and be careful
not to read modern ideas into ancient rules.
Thus, in what we would call offenses against the government,
the great and lasting definition of treason not being reached until
the reign of Edward III (A. D. 1352, Stat. 25th Edw. III), we find
Alfred the Great calling them: "Plotting against the king's life,"
"Plotting against a lord," "Fighting in the king's house," "Breaking the king's peace."
False coinage was known as "false moneying," and false coiners were known as "moneyers," the terms being
used without definitions, but as if well understood.
In offenses
against public justice we have the germ of the crime of perjury referred to as "a false compurgation." Offenses against the church
were "heathenism," "the worship of idols, of the sun, the rA-oon, fire
or rivers, water-wells, stones or forest trees," as well as witchcraft
and "making offerings to devils." Adultery, incest and fornication
were dealt with ecclesiastically, though mentioned in secular statutes.
Offenses against individuals, as we would call them, consisted of
homicide, wounds, rape and assaults and batteries. Definitions were
assumed. The distinction between murder and manslaughter, as
Hale knew and defined it, was' unknown. At the same time there
were very just-and intelligent discriminations between homicides that
were wilful, justifiable and accidental. A killing that was secret, or
treacherous, or in violation of fealty, or accompaniel by a concealment of the corpse or by sorcery or sacrilege was of an aggravated
type. A killing of an outlaw, or an adulterer taken in flagrante delicto, or in defense of one's lord or a kinsman, or the killing of a
thief, provided a declaration of the fact and the circumstances was
at once made, was justifiable. A killing resulting from the felling of
timber, or from a man staking himself upon a spear carried carelessly on the shoulder of another, or from fright or violence in dangerous games and-exercises, was viewed as accidental.
Of what we would call offenses against the person, resulting
from batteries, there were thirty-six instances given with particularity
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from head wounds, hair wounds, ear wounds, eye wounds, nose
wounds, limb wounds, hand wounds, nail wounds, feet wounds, belly
wounds, and rib wounds to the rupture of great sinews, small sinews,
or of the tendons of the neck. Rape was forbidden, whether of
- adults, infants or slaves.
Offenses against property included house-breaking, house-burning, setting fire to woods, and the various forms of theft, robbing and
stealing, cattle-taking being the commonest.
The consequences of most of these acts, aside from the features
of feud and vengeance, upon which I have already dwelt sufficiently,'
were almost entirely pecuniary. Every man had his price or value
according to his station in life, and every part of the body, however
minute, had its value nicely adjusted to a scale or tariff of compensation. This was also true of property.
The wergild was the price or value of the man killed, and must
be paid to his kinsmen; the bote was the compensation to the injured
party for the wrong sustained; it might be due to the king if the injury affected him in his private capacity; the wile was the penalty or
fine due to the king in his public capacity. Regarding these provisions as steps forward in support of the royal efforts to persuade men
to resort to a court as an alternative to force, we readily perceive
that the wer and the bote dominated the code. As Holdsworth says:
"We cannot understand either the amount of the wergild or the
method of its payment unless we remember that it took the place of
the feud, and that the feud was always in the background, to be resorted to if the money was not paid. 'Buy off the spear or bear it,'
ran the English proverb." That the spear might be finally resorted
to appears from the 42nd Section of Alfred's laws, regulating the
conditions under which the feud might be prosecuted, "That the man
who knows his foe to be homesitting fight not before he demands
justice of him. If he have such power that he can beset his foe and
besiege him within, let him keep him within for VII days and attack
him not if he will remain within. And then after VII days, if he
will surrender and deliver up his weapons, let him be kept safe for
XXX days, and let notice of him be given to his kinsmen and his
friends. * * * In like manner, also, if a man come upon his foe,
and he did not know him before to be homestaying, if he be willing
to deliver up his weapons, let him be kept for XXX days, and' let
notice of him be given to his friends; if he will not deliver up his
weapons, then he may attack him." This was followed by the law
of Ine, the immediate successor of Alfred, which imposed a penalty
if revenge was taken before justice was demanded. And thus the
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stage was reached when compensation, at first optional, became
obligatory. This system of compensation had a curious feature
which developed in an unexpected but very human way. As soon
as the criminal jurisdiction through the wites, or fines due to the
crown, became a source of profitable revenue, the king granted to
prelates and thegns manorial rights to fine and punish just as he
would grant land. Canute, the Dane, finding that his jurisdiction was
extending, asserted boldly that certain crimes and, the profits of their
administration belonged to him, and thus came the first list of what
in later days were known as pleas of the crown.
There were certain acts, however, which defied restraint, and the
Kings, instead of attempting coercion, wisely defined the occasions
upon which physical force could be used. Alfred provided that if
a man be slain, the slayer must show that his victim was attacking
either himself, his kin, or his lord, or that he was wronging his wife,
mother, sister or laughter. Athelstan, that he was in the act of carrying off stolen property, and Ine, that he was resisting capture under
circumstances which made capture proper. The inference is plain
that if the circumstances' justified it, the execution might be summary.
"It is," says Stephen, "a single step, but still a step, however short,
from private war and blood feuds; when people are invested by law
with the right of inflicting summary punishment on wrongdoers whose
offenses injure them personally." We have heard much of late about
"the law of nature," or "the unwriten law," from the lips of counsel
who had forgotten, or who more probably did not know, what was
contained in the Saxon dooms. A particular case of summary execution was the law of Infangthef. In the laws of Edward the Confessor, who was the last of the Saxon law givers, and whose code,
being a summary of the work of his predecessors, earned for him the
title of Re.ttutor, there is express recognition of a right which was
centuries old even in his day-the right to slay a thief "handhaving,"
or, as later, taken "with the mainour," or, as we would say, "caught
with the goods." Later it was converted into a franchise of the
right to hang, and was made the subject of royal charters long before the Battle of Hastings, when the Norman conquered the Saxon,
and existed even as late as the 13th century. The private gallows
of a manor was an object so common as to excite no surprise. In-.
fangthef was the right to hang a thief if taken within one's own
house or territory, and Utfangenethef, wherever caught, provided
in both instances the thief was taken in possession of the thing stolen.
We have the authority of Mr. Pike for stating that the Lord set great
value upon his privilege of holding his own Court, and not less upon
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his privilege of hanging his own thieves. Even when the offender
had committed a theft without the limits of the land held by his Lord,
it seems to have been in some places an established custom that he
was to be brought back and hanged upon the gallows which his, Lord
had provided for him. The cattle ranges of our own day will supply
us with modern iliustrations.
It is now in order to turn our attention to the Courts. We must
divest ourselves of modern notions, and even of those which belonged
to the days of the Normans. We must grope our way back to a time
when jurisdiction was not established, when process, as we know it,
was unknown; when methods of trial and rules of evidence did not
exist. We must deal with legal protozoa. There were little assemblies of men held in the hundreds, and in the counties, and about the
person of the King, which exercised judicial functions in dealing with
deeds of violence; these were the germs from which, in later days,
sprang the proud and orderly establishments of the English Judiciary.
The judicial unit, so to speak, was the hundred Court, and the hundred was a sub-division of a county. The hundred Court was composed of the freemen of the hundred, presided over by the earldorman,
the reeve, or other specially chosen head. A Court was sometimes
attached to a manor, and exercised its functions by virtue of a royal
grant or by custom, and exercised both criminal and civil jurisdiction.
It was provided by ordinance of Edgar that the hundred Courts should
be held every four weeks, and that poor and rich alike were entitled
to have right done to them. The County Court was of greater importance and dignity, and was appointed to be held twice a year, and
was presided over by the Sheriff of the County. Besides attending
to larger business, it reviewed the acts of the hundred Courts, th6ugh
we must be cautious about using the adjective appellate. Above them
.was the King, listening to the complaints of his subjects from whatever source arising. But it is to be remarked that Pollock and Maitland have twice emphasized the statement that the notion of all jurisdiction and public justice proceeding from the King did not belong
to the Anglo-Saxon period. It is asserted by Asser, the annalist of
Alfred the Great, that the King inquired into the correctness of the
decisions of his judicial officers, and threatened them with removal
for their ignorance or disregard of law. Baker, in his chronicle, attributes a stricter. control to Edgar, the grandson of Alfred, in severely punishing his judges if found to be delinquents, and we are
told in the Mirror of Justices, which Lord Coke calls "a very ancient
and learned treatise of the laws' and usages of this Kingdom," that
Alfred hanged forty-four justices in a single year for having falsely
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saved men guilty of death; for sentencing men who had been acquitted; for disregarding irregularities in jury service; for usurping
jurisdiction; in sho'rt, who "had falsely hanged any man against law
on any reasonable exception."
I do not think that we can give
credence to the tale, not alone because it has been discredited by such
scholars as Maitland and Stephen, but because the offenses attributed
to the Judges were in many particulars unknown to any condition of
law prior to the reign of Edward I, and particularly because Jury
Trials and jury service were unknown.
The only forms of Trials known to the Anglo-Saxon, if trials
they could be called, were by Compurgation and the Ordeal. Compurgation, which was not peculiar to the Anglo-Saxons, but which
reigned from Southern Italy to Scotland, can be traced, as the profound American scholar, Henry C. Lea, tells us in his work on Superstition and Force, to the principle of the unity of families. As
the offender could summon his kindred to resist an armed attack of
the injured party, so he took them to Court to defend him with their
oaths. This was not a defense upon evidence based on knowledge
of the facts; it was a denial by the accused in these words: "By the
Lord, I am guiltless, both in deed and counsel of the charge of which
Naccuses me." And the compurgators simply swore: "By the
Lord, the oath is clean and unperjured which he hath sworn." This
amounted to an acquittal. The principle survived in Wager of law,
in an action of debt, which was not finally abolished until 1833 by
the Sta. 3 and 4, Wm.IV, c. 42, 5, 13, and it still exists ira the practice of summoning witnesses to good character upon the defense of
a modern criminal trial.
Then followed the Ordeal. If it were not a first offense, or if
the accused was unable to command the necessary number of compurgators; or if the compurgators were not of the necessary rank
to overcome the lack of numbers, the appeal was made to God's judgment of fire or water. Of these judgments the ordeal of fire and hot
iron was applied to noblemen, thanes and freemen, as being more
honorable and easy; the ordeal of water was reserved for husbandmen or,persons beneath the rank of freemen.
The rite was a religious one conducted by priests in a church and
the intervention of Providence was assumed to be secured to the innocent. After three days of praye, and fasting, the accused plunged
his naked hand, or hiq arm to the elbow if the offense was grave, into
boiling water, and picked up a stone, at the bottom of the, vessel. The
hand o arm Ivas then bound in cloths, ,which were removed at the
end qf three days. If there were traces of scald, he wa held' to be
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guilty, if none, then Heaven had worked a miracle to declare his innocence. In the cold water ordeal, the accused, after three days of
prayer and fasting, was tied with his thumbs to his toes, and thrown
into deep dater. If he sank he was innocent; if he floated he was
guilty. There were other forms, such as carrying of red-hot iron a
distance of nine feet, or of walking with bare feet over red-hot ploughshares, and in the case of priests there was prescribed the swallowing
of the corsned, or morsel of execration, which in the case of guilt
would choke the accused through the paralyzing effect of fear upon
the salivary glands, but the principle was the same, that God would
work a miracle in behalf of -innocence.
Punishment consisted of fines, death, mutilation or flogging.
Imprisonment was unknown. As to fines, prices were set upon a
man according to his rank. If he was killed, the fine was to be paid
to his relations according to a tariff of compensation.
If he was
convicted of theft, he had to -return the article or its value, and in
some cases pay a fine to his lord or to the king. Most first offenses
were punished by fine alone, but housebreaking, arson, open theft,
secret murder and treason against a lord were by the laws of Alfred
and Canute punished, by death or mutilation. Upon a second conviction, every minor offense was followed by death or mutilation.
The sentence in the case of death was "Let him be smitten so that
his neck break"; in case of mutilation, "Let his hands be cut off, or
his feet, or both, according as the deed may be. And if he have
wrought yet greater wrong, then let his eyes be put out, and his
nose and his ears and his upper lip be cut off, or let him be scalped."
We read also of burnings and floggings. The distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, so much dwelt upon in later days, was unknown. In fact, the word felony was supposed by the learned Spelman to be of feudal origin, because for every felony a man forfeited
his fee, although Lord Coke derived it from the Latin fel, gall or
malignity, signifying that what was done was out of a malignant
spirit. But these are far later-day refinements.
If we take a steady but comprehensive look at the phenomena of
Anglo-Saxon law, arranged in groups according to their characteristic features, and assign each to its proper epoch in the various
stages of successive development, we find that the original Teutonic
doctrine of self-help or of private vengeance had passed in an appreciable though very incomplete degree into the control of the courts
determining, primarily, the lawfulness of the intended act, and, secondarily, the formulm by which justice might be sought, and, as a
consequence, securing compensation for almost every wrong, in place
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of impulsive bloodletting and savage acts. We find also judicial efforts-crude, barbaric and superstitious though they were-to settle
controversies by the oaths of the parties and their friends, instead of
by their spears and staves; and failing by human means to reach a
conclusion, to call on high Heaven to work a miracle in behalf of
innocence.
It is noticeable also that the work of the courts, in hundreds, in
manors, in counties and in the presence of the king, was irregular,
conflicting and decentralized. To bind subordinate tribunals, either
to uniformity of action or to subjection to a central and final authority, was the task of far later times. The effort was not made, not
simply because it would have failed, but because there was and could
be no conception of its necessity. There was no king's peace in the
sense of extending to all men and to every corner of the kingdom.
There were certain limited and partial jurisdictions proclaiming peace,
which centuries later became consolidated. There was the king's peace,
the peace of the church, the peace of the sheriff, the peace of the lord,
the peace of the household. The king's peace was not for all men,
nor for all places. Originating in the special sanctity of the king's
house, or the king's highway, or the king's presence, it extended its
protection solely to the king's attendants and servants, and later to
those whom he admitted to the same footing. The peace of the
church extended to its own members in priestly office, or to its own
sacred territory of buildings or manorial holdings, in which a hunted
fugitive sought sanctuary. The peace of the sheriff as a county
judge was based on the frank pledges by which each hundred, and
tithing sought to secure and to answer for the good conduct of its
inhabitants. The peace of the lord in his manor was a reflection of
that of the king, repeated in every barony. The peace of the householder was personal and individual, and for every fight around his
table atonement had to be to him. The time had not yet come for
all these to coalesce and run into the notion that the king's peace
would be general, exclusive, eternal and cover the land. It suggests
to me the action of drops of quicksilver upon a table-little by little
the smaller drops approach and become merged into the larger ones,
until the largest one absorbs all the rest, but as yet the drops were
separate and in many places far apart.
On the whole, it'is clear that we cannot use the term criminal
law in a technical sense in the Anglo-Saxon period. As Holdsworth
says: "A primitive system of law has no technical terms. It has
rules more or less vague, and terms corresponding thereto, which
will, if the law has a continuous history, become the technical rules
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and give rise to the technical terms of later days." He adds: "Even
when we have attained to these technical distinctions, the criminal
law will retain some traces of the processes by Which these distinctions have been evolved."
It has been the effort of this paper to give a concise and comprehensive account of these origins and processes in Anglo-Saxon days.

